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Recession is not the problem for Northamber

Hardware distributor, Northamber reported its latest results to the Stock Exchange this week and has made redundancies as it deals with the fall in sales. It comments on two positive aspects, better margins and good cash reserves. It was, however, unwilling to express any view on the outlook and has posted a small loss in the first quarter of its financial year compared to a small profit for the same quarter last year.

With sales around the £180m mark for the year ended June 08, the profit of £627k is a classic example of net profit being a very small number between two very big ones. The problem for the management team is that profits have been close to break even for three years now – in other words the core problem is not the recession, but the strategic direction.

On the one hand it’s done a good job in controlling costs as sales decline, but on the other, how long can it continue to operate as a public company with such a low return on capital?

It is actually destroying value as the operating profit is less than the cost of capital, which is an unsustainable business model.

Vendors relying on Northamber as a route to market should be concerned as to the longer term outlook and should be asking tough questions about the strategy. With its cash pile, Northamber can afford to act decisively now to move to a new business model and direction.  Leave it much longer and it could find itself with nowhere to go.

Why the urgency? Well £11m represents 22 days trading. So if vendors pull in their credit limits by 15 days and resellers take a week longer on average to pay their invoices, that cash pile will vanish. While Northamber can take action to control their Days Sales Outstanding, they may not be able to do much about the vendors view of credit risk.

The good news is that Northamber’s management team has been around, and stuck together, for a long time, but its shareholders may be wondering where the upside is.

 

Gross margin is a dangerous measure in times of recession

For most companies, the Gross Margin is one of the most important measures of business performance. In this blog, we are going to show you why it could be the most dangerous measure during these recessionary times.

How can that be? Surely all profit is good, so more is better, right? Well, as they say, it DEPENDS…

Take a distributor, dealer or a retailer selling two products, that happen to have identical gross margins.

One (let’s call it a Widget) is a well known brand that practically sells itself, virtually never gets returned, works just the way the customer expected and comes in a square box that stacks neatly up to six feet high.

The other (let’s call it a Sprocket) is new in to the market, often gets returned because the instructions suffered in the translation and frankly it isn’t that reliable anyway, and it comes in some fancy packaging that involves several see through plastic bubbles and can’t be stacked.

You’re probably ahead of me here, but which one actually makes the most profit for the retailer? The Widget, – but hang on they make the same gross margin! How can that be?

The concept that applies here is call the Contribution Margin and it takes into account all the ways a product affects the dealer or retailer’s operating costs. So the Sprocket makes a lower contribution margin because it incurs:

  • a higher selling cost because it takes more time to sell as no-one’s heard of it before
  • a higher product support cost because customers keep asking how to make it work
  • a higher reverse logistics costs because it gets returned a lot
  • a higher warehousing, shipping and display cost because it’s awkward to handle, takes up more room and space in the supply chain and in the store

In retail, these costs are called Direct Product Costs and they are deducted from the Gross Margin. In other channels they are recognised as Variable Costs. Either way the Contribution Profit is calculated taking these costs into account and the Contribution Margin (Contribution Profit divided by Sales Revenues) reveals the true picture.

Why is this so important in recessionary times?

The contribution margin is so called because it is about measuring the contribution to fixed costs. And in recessionary times, it is the fixed costs that cause the problems because the lower level of sales can’t generate enough profit contribution to pay for them all. (And being fixed, means that it usually takes quite a time before you can take action that will reduce these costs, which include Payroll, rent, depreciation etc).

If you were to focus only on gross margins, you might think it didn’t matter whether you sold Widgets or Sprockets, but the contribution margin tells you that you will make a muich bigger contribution to fixed costs if you sold more Widgets.

Obviously as long as a Sprocket makes a positive contribution (ie it has a contribution margin > 0) then it’s better to sell a Sprocket than nothing. But if you can influence the customer, you’d want them to buy a Widget instead of a Sprocket.

So what can I do if I work for a widget or sprocket vendor?

The easiest thing you can do to improvee the contribution margin is to improve the gross margin. This might mean offering higher discounts, greater rebates (in return for increased sales volumes).

After that the best thing to do is to help with the marketing costs in the form of funding or special allowances. These could be tied to performance such as  putting the product on display, into special locations or including it in special promotions.

Alternatively, the funding can be directed into special programs that focus customers on your product (but if the dealer or retailer incurs increased costs that you simply reimburse, then contribution is not improved).

Finally you can bear some of the costs, such as the reverse logistics, product support which work very directly on contribution; or increase brand advertising and promotion to increase consumer demand which works on lowering the cost of selling.

Does this mean Contribution Margin is the best measure to use in recessionary times?

It’s certainly the best Return on Sales measure, or margin measure. In the next blog, we shall show the best overall measure, which is a specific type of Return on Capital measure..and as we know capital is in rather short supply just now.

Comments? Questions? We’ll try and help. If you want to go into these topics in more depth, check out Julian Dent’s book “Distribution Channels – Understanding and Managing Channels to Market”.

 

Why retailers fear recession more than the credit crunch

The Credit Crunch and Recession seem to be inextricably linked, but the impact of these two economic events is quite different. And this difference applies especially to Retailers, where the Recession will have far greater and more damaging consequences than the Credit Crunch.

If your business depends upon the Retail channel, then you should be taking action now to help your channel whilst, at the same time, protecting your own interests.

Recession versus Credit Crunch
A Recession is something we see on a cyclical basis to a greater or lesser degree and anyone over 30 will have lived through at least one major recession. It is in essence a period when demand weakens as confidence evaoprates. The Credit Crunch by comparison is a much rarer event that last ocurs when the bad lending judgement of the world’s banks come home to roost in such a way as to destroy capital and remove liquidity from the economic system. In this current situation, a combination of dodgy loans based on property and increasingly exotic instruments that leverage the risk have been exposed by a sharp fall in the underlying property values. The effect is to suck credit out of the economy as banks become unwilling to lend to each other and thus to businesses. The two events are linked and feed on each other, but their impacts are very different.

The impact on the Retail channel
Retail is all about making high volumes of sales at good enough margins to cover the overheads of the business. Almost all sales are for cash or cash equivalents (credit card slips turn into cash overnight) whilst suppliers are paid on credit and inventory is kept to a minimum. Many retailers use their huge buying power to extract extended credit so can sit on a cash float for a month  or so before paying their suppliers. Tesco for example is sitting on a cash pile of £2bn, Best Buy used to hold around $1.5bn (more on why this has come down to 0.5bn later) and Walmart has $7bn. The fundamental business model is to sell for cash and pay on credit, so the the credit crunch does not put their business at risk in the way that businesses that sell on credit are becoming exposed.

What does affect the Retail business model is the Recession because this damages sales volumes over a longer period. It’s akin to a coastal farmer survivng a Tsunami, but then suffering the effects of losing his home, crops and equipment.  The lack of credit in the economy compounds the damage caused to confidence….and an uncertain consumer stops buying. Hence we have seen the shift to thrift as value brands benefit (Aldi, Lidl, Primark) in grocery and apparel, but other sectors such as household, electricals, fast moving consumer goods, consumer electronics, fashion, Do-It-yourself, have seen sales fall off a cliff. Retailers have fixed overhead costs (staff salaries, rents and utilities, distribution and IT systems) that are hard to cut quickly, so falling sales leaves their overhead base exposed like rocks as the tide goes out. This means net profits can quickly turn to net losses, eating into those famous cash piles.

Some costs related to marketing and promotions can be cut quickly but these are the key to another factor – getting customers to the store. In hard times, most businesses look at their order book as a leading indicator of how things are going to go. In other words they can see what is going to happen to sales beforehand. Retailers don’t have order books – they open the doors each day and wait to see who they have enticed into the store. That’s why everyone anxiously watches the daily sales numbers like a hawk – the trouble is this is a lagging indicator. By the time you know what’s happening, it’s happened.

What can Retailers do in a Recession?
There is a fairly familiar pattern to what vulnerable retailers do (none of which they really want to do):

  1. Cut back on planned store openings (new stores take time to reach profitable sales levels and even longer in a recession). The trouble with this is that it leaves the retailer increasingly in the wrong part of town
  2. Put pressure on suppliers to help finance more aggressive marketing and promotional activity. Tesco recently announced it was asking its non-food suppliers to make a contribution of up to 5%.
  3. Trim overheads by making a thousand small cuts while staff hiring is frozen. This means the best staff leave for places that treat them better and tends to harm staff morale, damaging customer service. Both Circuit City and CompUSA were slated for customer service in the period before their demise
  4. Discount deeply to keep the inventory moving. Lower sales means slower turning inventory, which means holding old or out of season inventory.
  5. Delay or minimise store refurbishments and resets. This leads to tired looking stores.
  6. Close Stores (Circuit City closed announced it was closing 20% of its stores a week before it filed for bankruptcy
  7. Shift promotions to “item and price”, in other words, any emphasis on positioning, value proposition or retail brand values is replaced with simple price-led programs.

On the other hand, strong retailers do the opposite of these things.  Look at Walmart: Chief executive Lee Scott said Wal-Mart would be taking a “thoughtfully aggressive” approach to any opportunities, which might include acquiring sites from retailers that have gone out of business. He said under these circumstances there were chances to negotiate “very good rents”. The retailer said it was looking at smaller store formats while focusing more of its efforts on online sales to drive growth, according to The Financial Times.

So it shouldn’t be too hard to work out how well your retail partners are coping with the recession using the seven key points above.

 

Key go-to-market partners are extending their payment terms – what is the cost to vendors and how much extra cash is required?

Last week Tesco announced that it was extending its payment terms to non-food suppliers by one month. This week Computacenter and DSGi did the same (channel web news). In doing so they joined the Forum of Private Business’s “Hall of Shame”. Click here to see if any of your partners are already listed there for late payment practices.

Many of the vendors who rely on these go-to-market partners have no choice but to accept the new terms or risk losing a vital chunk of their market access. But what is the cost to them of this move? How much extra cash is required to fund the new terms at current volumes?

The cost of extended credit

Here’s an illustration assuming $10m of sales is made to the partner:

Sales to partner $10m
Increased credit  taken by partner 30 days
Cost of capital (typical) 12%

Cost of extended credit is $10m x 30/365 x 12% = $82,192

This is 0.82% of sales, which could be almost a fifth of the net profit from sales to this partner if the vendor is making say a 5% net profit.

Extra cash required to continue trading at current volumes

Assuming our vendor can take that kind of hit to its net profitability, does it have the cash reserves to be able to do so?

Extra cash required = $10m x 30/365 = $821,918

So the vendor needs to pump almost an extra $1m permamnently into its working capital investment in this partner…

Is it worth it?

The key measure to apply here is the return on working capital that the go-to-market partner delivers and to balance that against the strategic need to be present in that partner for credibility and market access. In some situations, there is no alternative, so the vendor has to accept its cost of going to market just increased (and Computacenter and DSGi are clearly leveraging their power in the value chain in making their move). For those vendors that do have options, then here is the relevant calculation:

Net profit on sales = 5% on sale of $10m = $500k

Working capital invested in partner  = 60 days sales = $10m x 60/365 = $1,644k

Return on working capital  = $500k/$1,644k = 30.4%

(Note that before these partners took extended credit, the return was double this at 60.8%)

If the vendor believes that the extended credit is going to be a permanent move (which is likely as most large retailers have established 90 days terms), then it has to ask itself if this is a sustainable business model. If not, then the vendor must start growing its partnerships with other go-to-market partners to shift business through them and away from the Computacenters and DSGis – even if at this stage, the changes are small steps.

For many vendors, partners such as Computacenter and DSGi are critical routes to market and this move will be a major shock to their profitability and return on capital. These vendors will need to find ways to leverage their increased investment in these partners – ensuring they are reaching and penetrating their target customer segments, growing their brand visibility and increasing their share of their partners’ resources and sales capabilities.

Questions? Other challenges? Other topics you would like to see covered? Respond to the blog or email Julian Dent at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

 

How to tell if your partners will survive the credit crunch and what you can do to improve their chances

Right now most businesses in the world of IT sales and distribution are doing two things – trying to finish 2008 without going bust and planning to survive in 2009, if not actually thrive. Be they manufacturers, distributors, resellers, retailers or etailers, the realities of running the business under these dramatically changed conditions are the same. Cash is key to survival, but simply monitoring the bank account will not be sufficient. And if you are relying on one or more channel partners to be around for a while yet to achieve your sales objectives, you need to know how likely they are to succeed under the credit crunch. In this blog, I am going to set out a few indicators that will help you tell if your partners are likely to make it through 2009, and some things you can do to improve their chances.

Liquidity – what is it and why does it matter?

First things first, is the partner going to make it through 2008? That all depends on its liquidity and its vulnerability to the changes in its customers’ behaviour and that of the banks. Liquidity means simply that the business has enough cash flowing through the business that it can pay its bills as they fall due. Often the first bill that causes a crisis is the payroll, as there is no scope for negotiating extended terms with employees. This is especially true of people-based businesses such as VARs and higher value dealers. After that it’s the statutory payables such as payroll taxes, VAT and other taxes, because the authorities don’t usually negotiate.

How can you tell if a business has enough liquidity? It should have been running a normal balance sheet before the credit crunch took hold where its current assets (inventory, receivables and cash) were greater than its current liabilities (payables, current portion of loans and overdrafts). Now it is especially critical that this is true. In fact it’s better to use what is known as the acid test: receivables and cash must be greater than current liabilities. This is because the bills may need to be paid before the inventory can be cycled back into cash.

When the credit situation gets tough, the tough … ask for more credit

Next look at what happens if the game changes. Tesco, a leading retailer has just unilaterally changed its payment terms from 30 days to 60 days for its non-food suppliers. Any distributor or manufacturer doing business with Tesco now needs to finance that extra 30 days credit, which is costly (it will take another 11.7% of sales to recover the extra cost), but more importantly sucks cash out of the trading cycle. If you were doing $1m of business with Tesco, you would now need another $82,000 cash just to keep trading at the current volumes.  For most distributors, only a few of its customers (usually retailers) have the power in its trading relationship to do that to them, but for many resellers, most of its customers may have the power to extend their credit taken, extending the cash-to cash cycle. How much strain can a business take? As a rough guide, most banks would have financed up to around 50% of the equity (share capital plus retained earnings) in the business. Today these limits are nearer 30% and often lower. You need to know how your partners stand in the power play with their customers in terms of being able to resist moves such as that made by Tesco. Instead of special pricing for deals, you may find the conversation will move to special credit for deals, enabling the dealer to pass the working capital burden to the vendor with the strongest balance sheet.

Beyond survival

Having enough cash and working capital to cope with tightened credit and demanding customers is one thing, but what do the plans for 2009 look like? One of the key tests we apply to any business is to look at whether that partner is creating value or destroying it. This means comparing the operating profit of the business to the cost of the capital employed in the business. If operating profit is greater, management has created value and if operating profit is smaller, then management has destroyed value. This may have seemed to be a bit of accounting jargon before, but in these times of very scarce capital, it is the ultimate measure. For example, if a business has $100m capital employed, then at today’s real rates, it will be costing it at least 10% to have secured that capital from its sources (shareholders, banks etc). So the business must make $10m operating profit before it has created any value at all. Note how this is lot more challenging than simply establishing a net profit versus a loss. It relates the profit to the resources used in making that profit. The plans for any partner for 2009 need to show how it will create value if it is to have any real chance of doing more than just surviving.

What can you do to improve your partners’ chances?

You need to do a rough calculation – is your “business model inside” a net enabler or a net drag on your partner? By business model inside, we mean the business model of your products in terms of the profitability and working capital requirements as they pass through the partner. To do this, first compare the operating profit your partner makes on your products to its average: Are your gross margins higher or lower? Will your contribution to overheads be higher or lower? Would the partner net out with better operating margins (ie the net margin before interest costs) if it just sold your products? Let say its operating margin is normally 2% of sales but for your products it is only 1.5%.

Do the same for the working capital required. Let’s say that its normal working capital requirement is 75 days as it has to pay most suppliers on 10 or 15 days to secure competitive margins, but for your products its requirement is 50 days as it can take 30 days to pay you without penalty. And let’s assume your business is worth $1m of sales a year out of the partner’s total sales of $5m. Calculating Value created on your business:

Working capital required: $1m x 50 days/365 days = 137k

Apply 10% interest costs to the working capital of $137k = $13.7k

Operating profit: $1m x 1.5% = £15k

So the value created is $15k operating profit less the $13.7k cost of capital = $1.3k


Comparing this to the partner’s overall business model:

 

Working capital required: $5m x 75 days/365 days = 1,027k

Apply 10% interest costs to the working capital of $1,027k = $103k

Operating profit: $5m x 2% = £100k

So the value destroyed is $100k operating profit less the $103k cost of capital = $3k

 

In this example, you should be leveraging your better working capital profile to both grow your share of the partner’s business and to turn its value destroying model into a value creating one. If the partner does not do this, then it will probably begin to fail in 2009, as it will not be generating an acceptable return on its capital, putting its sources of capital at risk…and therefore its liquidity – something you know it cannot afford to do.

What should you be doing now?

Here’s a checklist of the topics should be covering in your next conversation with your partners:

  1. How are customers reacting to the credit crunch and general market conditions?
  2. Have credit limits from suppliers/distributors changed recently?
  3. How is the effect of these changes affecting the cash to cash cycle and liquidity within the business?
  4. What actions is the partner planning to take to respond in the short term?
  5. What role can you (as a strategic partner) play in these actions?
  6. How secure are its sources of funding for 2009 and what is likely to happen to its cost of capital?
  7. How does the net profitability on your lines compare with that of the partner’s overall business?
  8. How does the working capital cycle compare?
  9. What actions is the partner planning to take to improve these two elements of its business model in 2009?
  10. What role can you (as a strategic partner) play in these actions?

Last Updated (Monday, 01 June 2009 09:46)

 
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